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Survol 1
Le Procureur général du Canada m’a demandé de préparer un rapport qui
compare l’avant-projet de la Loi sur la stabilité des marchés des capitaux (la
LSMC)

2

à la réglementation en matière de risque systémique de trois autres

juridictions : les États-Unis (É.-U.), le Royaume-Uni (R.-U.) et l’Union
européenne (UE). Dans le cadre de ce rapport, j’examine aussi, au besoin, les
mesures internationales visant à définir et à répondre au risque systémique 3.
Les économistes tout comme les régulateurs reconnaissent que le risque
systémique est une préoccupation réelle et continue. Il est généralement
reconnu, dans la communauté internationale, que la crise financière de 2008 est
apparue dans l’espace règlementaire des les marchés des capitaux. Puisque les
conditions de base et les structures réglementaires varient d’une juridiction à une
autre, les réponses réglementaires de l’après-crise sont aussi différentes dans
chaque juridiction. Cependant, en ce qui a trait aux réponses de l’après-crise des
thèmes communs se recoupent dans toutes ces juridictions, notamment:

1

Je remercie Kelly Kan et Mona Yousif, respectivement JD 2017 et 2016 de l’Allard School of
Law, pour leur aide à la recherche exceptionnelle dans le cadre du présent projet.
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Le présent rapport est fondé sur l’ébauche d’avant-projet de la LSMC que j’ai reçue de Justice
Canada le 23 décembre 2015. La LSMC contient plusieurs sections distinctes et couvre tant la
réglementation du risque systémique que les questions relevant du pouvoir fédéral en matière
criminelle. Il contient aussi des dispositions administratives et d’application de la loi qui découlent
des dispositions de fond. Le présent rapport ne porte que sur les aspects de la Loi portant sur la
réglementation du risque systémique et sur la collecte de données, c.-à-d. les Parties I et II.
3

Le présent rapport adopte la définition de « risque systémique » établie dans un rapport conjoint
de la BRI, du FMI et du CSF au G-20 en 2009 : [TRADUCTION] « Le risque d’une perturbation des
services financiers i) causée par l’entravement de l’ensemble ou d’une partie du système
financier et ii) susceptible d’avoir des conséquences négatives graves sur l’économie réelle. La
notion d’effets externes négatifs provenant de la perturbation ou la défaillance d’une institution
financière, d’un marché ou d’un instrument est un élément fondamental de la définition. Tous les
types d’intermédiaires, d’infrastructures ou de marchés financiers sont susceptibles de présenter
une certaine importance systémique ». Fonds monétaire international, Banque des règlements
internationaux et Conseil de stabilité financière, Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance Of
Financial Institutions, Markets And Instruments: Initial Considerations. 2009. Disponible en
anglais seulement : https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/100109.pdf. Ce rapport utilise
également le terme réglementation macroprudentielle de manière interchangeable avec le terme
réglementation du risque systémique.

* Traduction non révisée par l’auteur du rapport

1. Garantir que les structures réglementaires nécessaires existent afin de
permettre de répondre rapidement, de façon proactive, efficace et
coordonnée au niveau national ou supranational (c.-à-d. l’ensemble du
marché), et;
2. Garantir que les régulateurs disposent d’un nouvel ensemble d’outils dans
le cadre des marchés de capitaux, lesquels sont différents de ceux
disponibles pour réglementer le marché des valeurs mobilières au
quotidien.
Au sujet du premier point : en comparaison avec les É.-U., le R.-U. et l’UE, le
Canada est la seule juridiction qui n’a pas de structure réglementaire au niveau
national (ou, pour l’UE, au niveau supranational) pour traiter du risque
systémique dans ses marchés de capitaux 4. Contrairement aux autres
juridictions dont il est question ici, le Canada n’a même pas la capacité de
recueillir les renseignements nécessaires, ni de répondre à des situations
urgentes.
Au sujet du deuxième point : en plus d’avoir la capacité de répondre de façon
significative au risque systémique, toutes les autres juridictions ont également
une structure réglementaire différente visant à identifier, réduire et répondre au
risque systémique. Chacune des juridictions examinées considère que la nature
du risque systémique est différente des risques quotidiens qui apparaissent au
sein marchés, risques que les régulateurs provinciaux couvrent clairement au
Canada. Le risque systémique est un risque menaçant le marché lui-même et,
en raison de son caractère généralisé, il agit différemment. Cela signifie que,
dans chacune des juridictions à l’étude, beaucoup des outils de réglementation
concrets mis en place pour répondre au risque systémique sont différents des
4

Aux fins de ce rapport, les « marchés de capitaux » sont les marchés financiers dans lesquels
sont vendus les titres d'emprunt et de participation, les instruments dérivés, ainsi que les
instruments à court terme, comme les opérations de pensions sur titre (repurchase agreements).
Ce sont les marchés dont les compagnies se servent pour mobiliser des capitaux. Ces marchés
font partie intégrante des « marchés financiers », plus vastes, qui aux fins de ce rapport,
signifient toutes les activités du secteur financier relevant du champ d’application des régulateurs
du secteur bancaire, de l’assurance et des marchés de capitaux.

outils de réglementation qui existent déjà pour la gestion des opérations
quotidiennes des marchés des valeurs mobilières.
L’ébauche d’avant-projet de la LSMC traite le risque systémique dans les
marchés de capitaux d’une façon conforme aux orientations politiques
internationales et aux avancées législatives d’après-crise des autres juridictions
(tenant compte des différences liées aux particularités institutionnelles et
constitutionnelles de chaque juridiction). En particulier, en ce qui a trait aux deux
points susmentionnés :
1. Garantir que les structures réglementaires nécessaires existent : la LSMC
comblerait une lacune en matière de risque systémique dans les marchés
de capitaux, offrant une capacité que les autres régulateurs nationaux de
marchés de capitaux aux É.-U., au R.-U. et à l’UE possèdent déjà. La
LSMC met l’accent sur la surveillance et la règlementation du risque
systémique dans les marchés de capitaux. Elle ne créerait pas un
organisme de surveillance du risque systémique visant les marchés
financiers dans leur ensemble. Elle n’établirait pas non plus un forum
multi-agences pour discuter et coordonner les actions portant sur le risque
systémique. Le Comité consultatif supérieur du Canada (CCS) remplit
déjà cette fonction, bien qu’il n’y ait pas de représentant d’un organisme
de règlementation des marchés de capitaux, ce qui limite grandement sa
portée. La participation de l’Autorité de réglementation des marchés des
capitaux (« l’Autorité ») au CCS comblerait cette lacune.
2. Garantir que les régulateurs disposent d’un nouvel ensemble d’outils dans
le cadre des marchés de capitaux : les pouvoirs prévus dans l’ébauche
d’avant-projet de la LSMC cherchent à cerner et à gérer le risque
systémique et non à protéger les investisseurs ou à garantir que les
marchés de capitaux sont justes et efficaces. La gamme de pouvoirs
prévus dans l’ébauche d’avant-projet de la LSMC correspond aux
pouvoirs en matière de risque systémique qui existent déjà dans les
autres juridictions étudiées dans le présent rapport.

Overview 1
The Attorney General of Canada has asked me to prepare a report that considers
the proposed Capital Markets Stability Act (CMSA) 2 in comparison to systemic risk
regulation in three other jurisdictions: the United States (US), the United Kingdom
(UK) and the European Union (EU). As part of this report I also discuss, as
necessary, international measures to define and address systemic risk. 3
Economists and regulators alike recognize that systemic risk is a real and ongoing
concern. It is generally accepted in the international community that the capital
markets were the regulatory space in which the financial crisis of 2008 developed.
Background conditions and regulatory structures differ from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, meaning that post-crisis regulatory responses also look different in
each jurisdiction. However, common themes run through all these jurisdictions in
terms of responses to the crisis. They are:

1

I am grateful to Kelly Kan and Mona Yousif, Allard Law JDs 2017 and 2016 respectively, for
exceptional research assistance on this project.
2
The present report is based on a draft proposed CMSA that I received from Justice Canada on
December 23, 2015. The CMSA contains several discrete sections and covers both systemic risk
regulation and matters under federal criminal law power, along with administration and
enforcement provisions that flow from the substantive provisions. This report addresses only the
systemic risk regulation and data collection aspects of the Act; i.e., its Parts I and 2.
3

This report adopts the definition of “systemic risk” put forward in a joint report by the BIS, IMF,
and FSB to the G20 in 2009: “the risk of disruption to financial services that is (i) caused by an
impairment of all or parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to have serious
negative consequences for the real economy. Fundamental to the definition is the notion of
negative externalities from a disruption or failure in a financial institution, market, or instrument.
All types of financial intermediaries, markets, and infrastructure can potentially be systemically
important to some degree.” IMF/BIS/FSB, Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance Of
Financial Institutions, Markets And Instruments: Initial Considerations, Report to the G20 Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors (October 2009). Available at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/G-20/pdf/100109.pdf. This report also uses the term
“macroprudential regulation” interchangeably with “systemic risk regulation”.
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1. Ensuring the necessary regulatory structure exists to give the jurisdiction
the ability to respond quickly, proactively, effectively and in a coordinated
fashion at the national or supranational (i.e., market-wide) level, and
2. Ensuring a new set of tools are available to regulators in the capital markets,
which are different in kind from those provided for to address day-to-day
securities regulation.
On the first point: as compared to the US, the UK and the EU, Canada is the only
jurisdiction that does not have the regulatory structure at the national level (or, for
the EU, the supranational level) to address systemic risk in its capital markets. 4
Unlike the other jurisdictions considered here, Canada lacks even the ability to
gather necessary information, or to respond in urgent situations.
On the second point: in addition to the capacity to respond meaningfully to
systemic risk, in all other jurisdictions we also see a different kind of regulatory
structure, geared toward identifying, reducing and responding to systemic risk. In
each of the jurisdictions studied, systemic risk is considered different in nature from
the kinds of day-to-day risks that arise within markets, which we see addressed by
the different provincial regulators in Canada. Systemic risk is a risk to the market
itself and, by virtue of its systems-level properties, it behaves differently. This
means that, in each of the jurisdictions examined, many of the concrete regulatory

4

For purposes of this report, “capital markets” are the financial markets in which debt and equity
securities and derivatives, as well as short term instruments like securities repurchase
agreements, are sold. They are the markets that companies use to raise capital. They are part of
the broader “financial markets”, which for purposes of this report means all financial sector
activities that fall under the jurisdiction of banking, insurance and capital markets regulators.
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tools put in place to address systemic risk are different in kind from the regulatory
tools that already exist to manage day-to-day operations of the securities markets.
The proposed CMSA addresses systemic risk in capital markets in a manner that
is consistent with international policy guidance and with post-crisis legislative
developments in other jurisdictions (once necessary differences due to each
jurisdiction’s unique institutional and constitutional arrangements are taken into
account). In particular, vis-à-vis the two points above,
1. Ensuring the necessary regulatory structure exists: the CMSA would fill a
gap around systemic risk in the capital markets, providing capacity that
other national capital markets regulators in the US, the UK and the EU
already have. The CMSA focuses on systemic risk oversight and regulation
in the capital markets. It would not create a broad systemic risk oversight
body over the financial markets as a whole. Nor would it establish a multiagency forum for discussing, responding to and coordinating action with
respect to systemic risk. Canada’s Senior Advisory Committee (SAC)
already serves that function albeit with no representation from a capital
markets regulator, which drastically limits its range. Adding the Capital
Markets Regulatory Authority (“Authority”) to SAC’s membership would fill
this gap.
2. Ensuring a new set of tools are available to regulators in the capital markets:
the powers provided for in the proposed CMSA are geared toward
identifying and managing systemic risk, not toward protecting investors or
ensuring fair and efficient capital markets. The suite of powers
contemplated in the proposed CMSA is in line with the systemic risk powers
that now exist in the other jurisdictions studied here.

iii
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Abbreviations used in this Report
INTERNATIONAL/TRANSNATIONAL
BODIES
IMF
FSB
BIS
G20
BCBS
IOSCO

EU / UK / US REGULATORS OR BODIES

International Monetary Fund
Financial Stability Board
Bank for International
Settlements

ESRB
ECB
ESAs

Group of Twenty
Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision
International Organization of
Securities Commissions

EBA
ESMA
EIOPA
ESFS
SEC

CANADIAN BODIES
BoC

Bank of Canada

CFTC

OSFI

Office of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions
Canadian Deposit Insurance
Corporation
Financial Institutions Supervisory
Committee
Canadian Securities
Administrators
Senior Advisory Committee

FSOC

CDIC
FISC
CSA
SAC

OFR

US Commodity Futures Trading
Commission
US Financial Stability Oversight
Council
US Office of Financial Research

FIO

US Federal Insurance Office

FDIC

US Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation
Bank of England
UK Prudential Regulation
Authority (subsidiary of BoE)
UK Financial Conduct Authority

BoE
PRA

BENCHMARKS

FCA

LIBOR

FPC
London Inter-Bank Offered Rate

EURIBOR
TIBOR
CDOR
CORRA

European Inter-Bank Offered
Rate

European Systemic Risk Board
European Central Bank
European Supervisory Authorities
(comprised of EBA, ESMA,
EIOPA)
European Banking Authority
European Securities and Markets
Authority
European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority
European System of Financial
Supervision
US Securities and Exchange
Commission

UK Financial Policy Committee
(housed in BoE)

OTHER ABBREVIATIONS

Tokyo Inter-Bank Offered Rate
Canadian Dollar Offered Rate
Canadian Overnight Repo Rate

CCP
OTC
MMFs
SIFI
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Central counterparty
Over-the-counter [derivatives]
Money Market Funds
Systemically important financial
institution

I.

Background: Global Recognition that Systemic Risk Called for a New
Set of Responses

1.

The following paragraphs describe the contemporary context in which the
legislators and regulators of the financial systems must work. My objective
in presenting this information is to facilitate the reader’s understanding of
the main concerns resulting from the last financial crisis (2007-2008) and
the international policy context before examining the specific national and
EU regulatory regimes.
The Last Financial Crisis and Systemic Risk

2.

As other experts in this file discuss, 5 it is widely recognized that the financial
crisis that began in 2007-2008 in North America was substantially a product
of unrecognized systemic risk building up within the capital markets. Its
impact extended far beyond just the capital markets – and beyond the
United States, the jurisdiction at the epicentre of the problems. Subsequent
rounds produced bank failures in many jurisdictions, a sovereign debt crisis
in Europe, and continued economic stagnation worldwide, demonstrating
the breadth and depth of the impact that excessive collective risk-taking in
the capital markets can have, and the extent of interconnectedness in
contemporary global financial markets.

3.

Systemic risk is understood to be of a different order of risk from the risks
associated with a loss of a particular investment, and to involve threats to

5

Notably Andrew Metrick, discussing money market funds, asset-backed commercial paper, the
repo market and OTC derivatives (paras 19, 24, 33 and 37) .
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the continued existence or functioning of the market as a whole. Systemic
risk may build up in highly complex and opaque markets, for highly complex
and opaque products, and if not addressed can lead to fast-moving,
unpredictable and potentially very damaging contagion and amplification
effects that develop at that level.
4.

Economists and regulators now understand that contemporary markets
behave like systems. Systems are characterized by interconnectedness,
unpredictability, and fast-moving, multiple round contagion effects. 6 The
behavior of markets as systems results from financial innovation, which has
broken down the formerly watertight compartments between banks,
insurance companies, and the issuers and market participants operating in
the capital markets. In each of these sectors, companies can now build and
market products that are functionally identical to investors. More
fundamentally, financial innovations marketed through the capital markets
have “shattered the atom” of conventional financial products, taking apart
the component elements of formerly straightforward instruments and
refashioning them into new ones. 7 This has altered the relationships

6

Two university-based dynamic systemic risk models track systemic risk in real time and publish
weekly results: they are the V-Lab at the Volatility Institute, NYU Stern School of Business and
the Centre of Risk Management (CRML), Faculté des Hautes Etudes Commercials, Université de
Lausanne, respectively at http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu and http://www.crml.ch/index.php?id=4. As the
FSB/IMF/BIS report above notes, different national jurisdictions are using different
methodologies, including network analysis and contagion modeling, to assess how the system
itself, and thus systemic risk, operates. Report, supra note 3 at Box 3, p. 20.
7

Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, “Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency
Costs, and Complete Financial Markets” (2008) 108 Colum. L. Rev. 231. The use of derivatives
has implications for the day-to-day regulation of the capital markets and for investor rights as well.
For example, “empty voting” and “morphable ownership” – that is, the separation of a share’s
economic interest from its voting rights through the use of equity derivatives – has undermined
the traditional link between vote and economic interest that conceptually underpins corporate
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between and among institutions, investors, and market participants,
introducing layers of complexity and interconnectedness. 8 Complex new
chains of institutions and relationships have been introduced, which can
circumvent prudential regulatory requirements (moving the products out of
the reach of banking regulation and into the securities markets where
“shadow banking” occurs), and fuel liquidity-dependent markets that, it turns
out, are inherently unstable in times of crisis. 9 While this innovation can

takeover bid regulation. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, “The New Vote Buying: Empty
Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership” (2006) 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 811 and “Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms” (2006) 61:3 Bus. Law.
1011. Nor are equity and debt instruments even entirely distinct anymore, thanks to innovations
such as “reverse exchange securities” (which create assets that are half share, half bond). See,
e.g., Tamar Frankel, “New Financial Assets: Separating Ownership from Control” (2010) 33
Seattle UL Rev 931 at 945- 946.
8

Professor Steven Schwarcz has discussed the challenge of complexity in the financial markets
in a way that helps shed light on what “systemic risk” entails today. He describes complexity in
the assets that underlie modern structured financial products — for example, variability in
property values, interest rates, mortgage terms, and the creditworthiness of individual
mortgagees — overlayered with complexity in the design of the structured products themselves
— for example, in the design of synthetic products so complex that adequate disclosure to
investors was virtually impossible — and exacerbated by complexity in modern financial markets
(including indirect holding systems and the widespread use of complex mathematical risk
modeling). Schwarcz examines how these multiple complexities can lead to inappropriate lending
standards, failures of disclosure, and a lack of transparency and even of comprehensibility.
Perhaps the most difficult problem to manage is that they also create a complex system
characterized by intricate causal relationships and a “tight coupling” within credit markets, in
which events tend to amplify each other and move rapidly into crisis mode. Steven L Schwarcz,
“Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets” (2009) 87 Wash U L Rev 211-268.
9
Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking
Crisis (2009) at 16, 21. Securitization is also based on complex mathematical modeling, which
can itself be flawed or oversimplified: ibid. at 22; see also Erik Gerding, “Code, Crash, and Open
Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis”
(2009) 84 Wash U L Rev 127-198. The FSB has identified shadow banking as a priority and
identified some of the main sources of systemic risk within and connected to the shadow banking
sector: FSB, Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation (27 October 2011):
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r 111027a.pdf?page moved=1.
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create more efficient capital markets for periods of time, it also amplifies
risk, makes it harder to track, allows it to coalesce in unanticipated places,
and threatens overall systemic stability. 10
5.

Regulators now appreciate that the market as a whole, as well as financial
innovation, continues to present new and poorly-understood risks. 11

6.

Aspects of innovative products and practices affect the day-to-day
operation of the securities market. Many of the risks created by these new
products can be addressed within a market, such as through disclosure

10

Schwarcz, supra note 8. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 7; see also Patricia A McCoy, Andrey
D Pavlov & Susan M Wachter, “Systemic Risk through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation
and Regulatory Failure” (2009) 41 Conn L Rev 1327.
11
Two examples of financial innovation that currently present new, poorly understood risk are: (1)
High frequency trading (HFT) – algorithmic trading using extremely fast computers, in which firms
move in and out of securities within milliseconds or less in order to take advantage of market
movements, and was responsible for the May 2010 Flash Crash; and, (2) “Fintech” – tech
companies’ incursion into the financial markets, seeking to disrupt incumbents’ positions using
entirely different business models. The best-known critique of HFT is Michael Lewis, Flash Boys:
A Wall Street Revolt (New York: WW Norton and Co., 2014); see also Harald Malmgren & Mark
Stys, “The Marginalizing of the Individual Investor” The Magazine of International Economic
Policy (2010) at 46; IOSCO, “Regulatory Issues Raised by the Impact of Technological Changes
on Market Integrity and Efficiency” (July 2011) at 16; IIROC, Administrative Notice, “IIROC Study
of High Frequency Trading – Completion of Final Phase” (December 9, 2015) summarizing the
results of their three-phase study, at http://www.iiroc.ca/Documents/2015/1daac865-ab9b-4ba79e7e-fd1588db2b5e en.pdf. On March 6, 2010, starting at approximately 2:45 pm, the S&P 500
dove an unprecedented 900 points. By 4pm closing it had recovered 600 of those points. The
crash was precipitated by an exceptionally large (and erroneous) electronic sell order for a
derivative that was keyed off the S&P’s value. While the order put downward pressure on the
S&P’s value, it was HFT traders’ algorithmic response to it that exacerbated the pressure and
created a crash. Andrei Kirilenko et al., “The Flash Crash: The Impact of High Frequency Trading
on an Electronic Market” (2011):
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce flashcrash0314.pdf
. The FSB has begun to examine the systemic risks that may arise from fintech: Letter from Mark
Carney, Chairman, FSB to G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (22 February
2016) at 1, 6: http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Chair-letter-to-G-20-Ministers-andGovernors-February-2016.pdf.
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requirements (as an investor-facing measure) or the duty of care imposed
on registrants (as a business conduct measure). At the same time, these
innovative products and practices can also create a different order of risk to
the financial system as a whole, which calls for an entirely different set of
regulatory responses.
Global Response
7.

The awareness of the importance of systemic risk has yielded new levels of
international coordination. Globally, regulators’ concerns have centered
around the clear need for better information (including how risks are
developing and how they are transmitted), the need for better coordination
across borders, better integration across regulatory silos, 12 and the capacity
to move quickly and collectively in urgent situations to avoid contagion, or
multiple rounds of spreading contagion. In short, the global policy response
has been based on the understanding that management of this risk requires
(1) the regulatory capacity to see and understand financial markets at the
systemic level, and (2) to respond quickly and effectively to prevent a
potential source of systemic risk from actually having an adverse impact, to
contain risk and to avoid contagion. The global community also recognized
that in the years leading up to the crisis, certain kinds of products in the
capital markets had been under-regulated, non-transparent, and complex,

12

As noted above, securities issuers, banks and insurers can now offer functionally near-identical
products for investors. The traditional financial regulatory structure, however, distinguishes
between banks, insurers and securities issuers and subjects each to a different regulatory
structure. In the wake of the last financial crisis, regulators realized that cross-border coordination
would be essential in future, but also that inter-regulatory coordination and “big picture”
integration had to be improved in order to eliminate regulatory gaps.
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and that the markets for them had been vectors for transmitting systemic
risk. Prominent among these were over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 13
and securitized products.
8.

No single institution or group has jurisdiction over or responsibility for what
is now a global financial system. The main players internationally, each of
which has either been created post-crisis to address systemic risk and
coordination, or which has generated new initiatives in response to the
crisis, are: 14
•

The Group of Twenty (G20) comprises 19 countries plus the European
Union. The first G20 national leaders’ summit was convened in November

13

OTC derivatives trade “over the counter”, meaning that they are bilateral contracts for, usually,
quite customized products. They can be contrasted with exchange-traded derivatives, for which a
public market, like the Montréal Bourse, exists. Exchanges provide transparency and price
discovery functions that the OTC market does not, and as such exchange-traded derivatives do
not present the same problems of opacity and the potential buildup of unrecognized systemic risk.
As well, because OTC derivatives tend to be customized, they also tend to be highly complex.
The market for them is much larger than the market for exchange-traded derivatives. Exchange
traded derivatives are standardized, comparable, and transparent by comparison. Within OTC
derivatives, the G20 Commitments developed another distinction: “standardized” OTC derivatives
are relatively common and quite liquid (e.g., “plain vanilla” interest rate swaps), while nonstandardized OTC derivatives are essentially the customized ones. Under the G20 Commitments
discussed immediately below, standardized OTC derivatives are now expected to be cleared
through a central clearing party, which mitigates the buildup of unrecognized systemic risk within
untracked bilateral contracts. A central clearing party interposes itself between buyer and seller of
a derivatives contract. Non-standardized OTC derivatives need not be cleared in that way, but
trades in them must still be recorded with a trade repository, which at least helps improve
transparency. G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit (September 24-25, 2009):
http://www.G-20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html at para. 13.
14

The list below does not include every potentially relevant international or transnational body.
E.g., it does not discuss the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
or the World Bank, since their contributions to the specific problem of systemic risk regulation in
the capital markets has been less central. Both sit on the FSB, however.
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2008 to coordinate a global response to the financial crisis. Since then, it
has become the primary policy forum for international economic
cooperation among G20 leaders. At its Pittsburgh summit in 2009, the G20
committed to a series of regulatory reforms (the G20 Commitments)
designed to address some of the most glaring regulatory failures leading up
to the last financial crisis, such as those in the OTC derivatives markets. 15
The G20 Commitments also recognize the necessity for tools to assess and
monitor the buildup of macroprudential risk. 16
•

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (www.bis.org): the BIS is an
organization of 60-some members, all central banks. Its membership
includes the central banks of all the jurisdictions discussed in this report,
including the EU. Its mission is to “serve central banks in their pursuit of
monetary and financial stability, to foster international cooperation in those
areas and to act as a bank for central banks”. The BIS houses the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), whose purpose is to provide
“a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its

15

G20 Leaders Statement, supra note 13. This report concentrates on the parts of the Pittsburgh
Summit commitments that deal with international financial regulation: see especially paragraphs
10 to 16 (under the heading, “Strengthening the International Financial Regulatory System”).
Other parts of the Leaders Statement address, inter alia, energy security, climate change, the
IMF and the development banks, and supporting the economically vulnerable.
16

G20 Leaders Statement, supra note 13, par. 12 under the heading, “Strengthening the
International Financial Regulatory System”.
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mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks
worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability.” 17
•

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) (www.fsb.org): The G20 established
the FSB in 2009 with the mandate to promote international financial
stability.

18

It is the main international body tasked with identifying,

understanding and coordinating responses to systemic risk, including in the
capital markets sector. It sets standards and policies, which its members
commit to implementing at the national level. Its members are
representatives – generally central bankers, finance ministers, and key
regulators – from 25 jurisdictions, as well as international financial
institutions and other bodies. 19 It has a secretariat (i.e., a professional staff)
housed within the BIS. The FSB describes its work in terms of a three stage
process: identifying systemic risk in the financial sector, helping to develop
and promote the implementation of effective regulatory responses to it, and
overseeing and monitoring implementation of those responses. It
designates “key standards for sound financial systems”, 20 produces highly

17

Bank for International Settlements, “About the Basel Committee,” September 30, 2015,
available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm. Canada, through OSFI, began adopting the
Committee’s latest version of capital rules for banks (Basel III) in 2013 and progress is ongoing.
18

Both the G20 and the FSB had their origins in the pre-financial crisis era, but both were
substantially modified in structure, membership and form in 2009. Their pre-crisis history is
omitted here.

19

Members from relevant jurisdictions include leaders of OSFI, the Bank of Canada and the
Department of Finance (Canada), the Treasury, Bank of England and FCA (UK), the Federal
Reserve, Treasury and SEC (US), and the ECB. IOSCO is among its international members, as
are the BIS and its Basel Committee, the OECD, World Bank, and IMF.
20

These standards are developed by other international standard setters – the IMF, the Basel
Committee, and IOSCO among others – and FSB designation indicates that they are “broadly

10

influential research reports, works cooperatively with other institutions
including the BIS, IMF and IOSCO, develops policy specifically concerned
with global financial stability and systemic risk, conducts “peer reviews” of
member states’ financial stability and their implementation of international
standards and FSB-recognized policies, 21 and delivers progress reports to
the G20. Among its most important reports are its 2009 report to the G20
on assessing the systemic importance of financial institutions, markets and
instruments; and its 2011 report and recommendations for strengthening
oversight and regulation in the shadow banking sector. 22
•

International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
(www.iosco.org): IOSCO’s membership comprises the securities regulators
in more than 115 jurisdictions 23. It seeks to set global standards within the
securities sector, provides technical assistance, education, training and

accepted as representing minimum requirements for good practice that countries are encouraged
to meet or exceed”. See FSB, Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems,
http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/about-the-compendium-of-standards/key standards/.
21

Canada’s peer review notes that “establishing a single national securities regulator would bring
clear economic benefits – a simpler regulatory infrastructure, easier coordination and information
sharing in the event of market distress, and improved cross-border cooperation. The IMF and the
OECD have both recommended this ” (going on to describe the Reference). FSB, Peer Review
of Canada: Review Report (30 January 2012) at page 7: http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/r 120130.pdf.
22

FSB/IMF/BIS, Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets
and Instruments: Initial Considerations, (2009), supra note 3; FSB, Shadow Banking:
Strengthening Oversight and Regulation (2011), supra note 9.
23

See https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=membership&memid=1. This includes four out of
ten of the Canadian provinces. Canada has three votes, not four, since the number of votes for
subdivisions of national units is capped at three:
http://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=becoming a member.
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research to its members, and coordinates with other international
organizations on matters of shared interest. It does not have a substantial
permanent staff. Its most important contributions for present purposes are
a set of standards, the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation
(substantially revised in June 2010), which have been endorsed by the G20,
the FSB and the IMF; a set of principles for financial market infrastructures,
jointly produced with the BIS; and a set of standards for financial
benchmarks, also endorsed by the G20 and the FSB. 24
•

International Monetary Fund (IMF) (www.imf.org):

the IMF is an

organization of 188 countries, working to “foster global monetary
cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote
high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty
around the world”. The IMF operates at the level of nation states, e.g.,
providing loans to member countries and providing technical assistance. Its
work is less relevant to systemic risk in the capital markets, but it works
alongside the FSB and other organizations in filling data gaps. With the
World Bank, it also evaluates member countries’ financial systems
(including banks, securities markets, pension and mutual funds, insurers,
market infrastructures, central bank, and regulatory and supervisory
authorities). It assessed Canada’s financial stability in February 2014. 25

24

IOSCO, “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation” (June 2010),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf; BIS/IOSCO “Principles for Financial
Market Infrastructures” (April 2012), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf; IOSCO, “Principles
for Financial Benchmarks” (July 2013):
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD415.pdf.
25

Their first key recommendation is discussed below, infra at note 50 et seq.
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9.

Multiple entities with different membership and structure all to some degree
aim to ensure the stability and robustness of the global financial system,
within which capital markets, banking, insurance, and policy are intertwined.
While the Financial Stability Board (FSB) is the single most important policyoriented body tasked with identifying, understanding and coordinating
responses to systemic risk, it has regularly coauthored reports with other
organizations. Thus, even when looking only at the capital markets sector,
it would present an incomplete picture to rely primarily on IOSCO alone.
Reforms to Regulatory Structures at the National and EU Levels

10.

Since the last financial crisis, many countries have adopted domestic
regulatory reform, in relation to both regulatory content and governance
structure, to meet international commitments and incorporate lessons
learned from the crisis with respect to systemic risk. This report considers
the regulatory regime in the US, the UK, and the EU. A more detailed
explanation of the regulatory structure of each regime, as well as a diagram
visually representing their current financial market regulatory structure, is
found in Appendix A.

11.

Every jurisdiction studied here, except Canada as it is now, has (1) a
systemic risk oversight and regulatory structure that spans financial sectors
(banking, insurance and capital markets), and (2) a set of tools capable of
detecting, monitoring, and preventing systemic risk in their national capital
markets.

12.

Some reforms by the comparator jurisdictions were more extensive –
notably, the UK. As well, reforms in each comparator jurisdiction were
necessarily different, reflecting differences in legacy regulatory structures.
13

13.

However, none of these jurisdictions has taken the approach of addressing
systemic risk going forward by focusing more on capital markets regulation
on its own – using the same tools as ever – within the parameters of its
traditional jurisdiction. The responses in these jurisdictions to the systemic
risk that arose in the capital markets and caused the financial crisis, even
though it had arisen originally in the capital markets, was not to conclude
that capital markets regulators had simply failed to discharge their
responsibilities. In every jurisdiction, systemic risk regulation post-crisis has
been understood to require a different regulatory structure and a different
set of tools than simply those that existed to answer to investor protection
and efficient market priorities in the capital markets. Each of the jurisdictions
discussed here turned its mind to ensuring that it had in place a regulatory
structure with the ability to respond quickly, proactively, effectively and in a
coordinated fashion at the national level (or at the supranational level for
the EU).

14.

The following are the common regulatory reforms taken by these
jurisdictions.

15.

Addressing shortcomings or gaps in existing regulatory structures, in terms
of systemic risk regulation in particular, by closing regulatory gaps:
•

Across jurisdictions: implementation specific measures, such as central
clearing and trade repository reporting for OTC derivatives, as agreed to by
the G-20;

•

The UK overhauled its financial regulatory structure. In response to a
perception that capital markets priorities had swamped prudential
regulatory priorities within a unified financial regulator, that unified regulator
was abolished and two new ones created. The UK adopted a version of
14

“twin peaks” regulatory structure, which allocates regulatory jurisdiction
primarily along functional lines rather than, as was traditionally the case,
along industry lines. The UK adopted a version of “twin peaks” regulatory
structure under which one regulator, the Prudential Regulatory Authority
(PRA), is responsible for prudential regulation of systemically important
institutions across all of banking, capital markets and insurance. A separate
regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), is responsible for investor
protection, business conduct, market integrity and competition across all of
banking, capital markets and insurance (as well as for prudential regulation
of smaller, non systemically important institutions); 26
•

Through the Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank), 27 the US clarified the division
of responsibilities between the SEC and the CFTC, set out the role of the
Federal Reserve in regulating systemically important financial companies,
and enhanced oversight of the OTC derivatives markets. The fact that
shadow banks (non-bank financial institutions operating in the capital
markets) were not subject to prudential regulation was addressed by
creating FSOC designation, as discussed below.

26

The term “business conduct” or “market conduct” in the capital markets are generally
understood to refer to professional regulation of registrants, meaning professionals operating in
the industry (especially dealers and advisors), to ensure that they maintain sound business
practices and appropriate prudential standards, that conflicts of interest are mitigated, that they
understand their clients’ needs and what would be an appropriate investment for them, and that
they do not take advantage of the informational asymmetry they possess relative to their clients.
In discussing business conduct regulation beyond capital markets (i.e., in banking and
insurance), the term should be understood to mean primarily prudential requirements.
27

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 USC 5301 (2010), s 113.
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•

In the EU, where the financial crisis evolved into the 2010/11 Eurozone debt
crisis, “Member States tried to address the systemic fragility of their banking
systems through national policy tools, but it became clear that, for those
countries [in the Eurozone] that shared a currency and were therefore more
interdependent, more had to be done.”

28

Reforms included addressing

gaps in banking oversight by creating a Banking Union (which applies to
Eurozone countries and can be joined by non-Eurozone EU countries). This
involved establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism, which grants the
European Central Bank a strong supervisory role for financial stability of all
banks in the Eurozone.
16.

New regulatory structures to specifically address systemic risk,
notwithstanding that existing regulators in some of these jurisdictions
already had jurisdiction over some aspects of systemic risk:
•

Dodd-Frank established a new systemic risk oversight body, the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The US overlaid FSOC over its
competent federal regulators that already possess jurisdiction over
systemic risk in the capital markets (Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)). The US
also created a new Office of Financial Research (OFR) to support FSOC,
and a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO) concerned with systemic risk in
the insurance sector.

28

See: http://ec.europa.eu/information society/newsroom/cf/fisma/itemdetail.cfm?item id=20758&newsletter id=166&lang=en and http://ec.europa.eu/finance/generalpolicy/banking-union/index en.htm.
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•

In the UK, the BoE is now responsible for overseeing UK financial stability
as a whole, including through its subsidiary the PRA, which prudentially
regulates systemically important financial firms, and through the Financial
Policy Committee (FPC), an independent subcommittee of the Court of
Directors of the Bank of England (BoE) with responsibility for identifying,
monitoring and responding to systemic risk.

•

The EU established a new overarching European System of Financial
Supervision (ESFS), which includes the new European Systemic Risk
Board (ESRB), and three sectoral European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)
with broad systemic risk powers in the form of a “specialized and ongoing
capacity to respond effectively to the materialization of systemic risks”. 29

17.

Ensuring the capacity to proactively and effectively identify systemic risk
problems across its financial sectors. This has mainly been done by creating
new research capacity and new systemic risk oversight bodies as discussed
above:
•

In the US, the OFR collects information on financial firms from regulators
and monitors the financial system to identify potential systemic risks. The
SEC also created a new Economic and Risk Analysis Division;

•

In the UK, the FPC is responsible for monitoring the stability of the UK
financial system and identifying and assessing systemic risks, and for
preparing semi-annual financial stability reports.

29

European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European
Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), Article 24(1), online:
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/ESRB-en.pdf?717d13c66b5166d0a0a792b400ea0d69
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•

In the EU, the relevant functions of the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB) concerning systemic risk include data collection, sharing
information with EU-level and national bodies, and collaborating with the
ESAs to identify and measure systemic risk, identifying and prioritizing risks.

18.

Ensuring the capacity to proactively and effectively respond to systemic
risk problems across its financial sectors:
•

In the US, the SEC and CFTC are the primary investor protection and
business conduct regulators for the vast majority of capital markets issues
and market participants. They can both regulate US capital markets “all the
way up” with respect to these concerns, including with respect to systemic
risk. 30 Now, the US FSOC can also designate financial companies,
including non-bank institutions operating in the capital markets, as
“systemically important financial institutions” (SIFIs). SIFI designation
results in increased regulation and supervision by the Federal Reserve, and
requires the institution to adhere to heightened prudential standards. This
ensures that systemically important non-banks are also subject to
prudential regulation, and it fills a gap that existed previously.

•

In the UK, the BoE directly prudentially regulates essential financial market
infrastructure, such as clearing houses, settlement systems and payment
systems. In relation to macro-prudential matters, the FPC has the authority
to give directions to the FCA and PRA requiring them to exercise their

30

They are “primary financial regulatory agenc[ies]” as defined in Dodd Frank §5301(12). For an
example of the SEC seeking to use what I am calling the top end of its jurisdiction, see the
discussion of the asset management industry, infra at note 44.
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functions in order to implement a macroprudential measure. 31 The PRA
and/or FCA must comply with the FPC’s directions as soon as reasonably
practicable. 32 The FCP also has the power to make recommendations to
the FCA, PRA, to the Treasury, within the Bank or to any persons, and the
FCA and PRA must either comply with the recommendation, or explain its
reason for not complying. 33 In certain circumstances, the PRA can exercise
a veto on the FCA: it may instruct the FCA to refrain from exercising its
regulatory authority, if the PRA deems that that action may threaten the
stability of the UK financial system or cause a financial institution to fail,
whose failure would have adversely affect the UK financial system. 34
•

The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) can issue warnings and
recommendations (to the Union, any member state, or any relevant EU or
member state regulator), which trigger an “act or explain” mechanism. 35

31
Financial Services Act 2012 ss. 9H. HM Treasury, in consultation with either the FPC or the
BoE, prescribes macro-prudential measures, which form the basis of the FPC’s directions. Ibid.at
s. 9L. The FPC also prepares policy statements, produces reports, and may make
recommendations within the BoE or to HM Treasury on select matters relating to its mandate:
ibid. ss. 9O, 9P, 9W.
32

Ibid., s. 9I.

33

Ibid., s. 9Q(3).

34

Ibid.,, s. 3I.

35
For example, the ESRB has recommended to member states that they designate an authority
entrusted with conduct of macroprudential policy and equip it with sufficient powers, which the
ESRB describes. ESRB, Recommendation on the macro-prudential mandate of national
authorities”, ESRB/2011/3, online:
http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/ESRB Recommendation on National Macroprudential Man
dates.pdf?87d545ebc9fe76b76b6c545b6bad218c. Following on the act or comply provisions, the
ESRB issued a detailed follow-up report assessing countries’ compliance with the
recommendation, and issuing countries final grades (showing that 24 of 29 countries were largely
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19.

Ensuring coordination between and within jurisdictions and regulators:
•

FSOC is responsible for facilitating information sharing and coordination
among financial regulators;

•

Each of the UK FCA and PRA has the duty to coordinate the exercise of its
functions with the other, and must co-operate with the BoE with regard to
financial stability; 36

•

The overarching European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS)
facilitates coordination across financial sectors, and between the EU and
national levels.
Financial Regulation in Canada

20.

Canada maintains a regulatory regime with jurisdiction divided along the
traditional industry or entity lines unlike, for example, the UK, which has
moved to a functionally-oriented division of responsibilities. The three main
sectors of regulation are: (1) Banks, which are federally regulated by OSFI;
(2) the day-to-day regulation of the capital markets as carried out by
provincial and territorial securities regulators; and, (3) insurance, which is
regulated at both the federal and provincial level.

or fully compliant by the deadline): ESRB Follow-up Report – Overall Assessment (June 2014),
online:
http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/recommendations/2014/ESRB 2014.en.pdf?b0f13f86c2fe485
5025f70a23ab0a258.
36

Financial Services Act, supra note 31 at ss. 3D, 3Q.
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21.

Canada also has a Senior Advisory Committee (SAC), a non-statutory
consultative forum for financial sector policy issues, including financial
stability and systemic vulnerabilities. SAC can coordinate among all the
federal-level entities. A more complete description of Canada’s regulatory
scheme and a representation by diagram is in Appendix B.

22.

In comparing Canada to the UK, the US and the EU, it is apparent that each
jurisdiction contains certain features and functions in common, with the
notable absence in Canada of a systemic risk regulator with responsibility
for the capital markets. This is represented by Table 1 below.
Table 1: Financial Regulatory Bodies Relevant to Systemic
Risk 37

Central Bank

Canada

US

UK

EU

Bank of
Canada (BoC)

Federal Reserve
System

Bank of England
(BoE)

European Central
Bank (ECB)
within Eurozone
and member
state central
banks

Sets monetary
policy, controls
money supply
& inflation, acts
as lender of
last
resort.
Independent of
political actors

Member state
central banks
beyond Eurozone

37
Financial regulation has other components not discussed here, since they are less directly
connected to systemic risk regulation. E.g., this table also does not specifically discuss credit
union regulation or pension fund regulation, or other consumer financial protection agencies (e.g.,
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in the US or the Financial Consumer Agency of
Canada). New initiatives for orderly resolution of systemically important financial institutions are
also not covered. Note as well that this table omits considerable detail, including e.g., that
depository insurance is broader in scope in some jurisdictions (the UK) than in others (Canada
and the US).
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Financial
Policy Body
(as relevant to
this report)

Canada

US

UK

EU

Department of
Finance

Department of the
Treasury

Her Majesty’s
Treasury

None at EU level

Coordination
among member
state economics
and finance
ministers through
EU Economic
and Financial
Affairs Council
(informal body) 38

Sets fiscal and
economic
policy

Depository
Insurance
Guarantees
depositors’
deposits in
identified
institutions,
generally
banks

Coordinating /
Oversight
Body
for

Canada
Deposit
Insurance
Corporation
(CDIC)

Federal Deposit
Insurance
Corporation
(FDIC)

Financial Services
Compensation
Scheme

All EU member
states have
depository
insurance
schemes,
harmonized in
accordance with
EU Directive on
Deposit
Guarantee
Schemes
94/19/EC

Senior
Advisory
Committee

Financial Stability
Oversight Council
(FSOC) makes

Bank of England
(BoE)’s Financial
Policy Committee

European
Systemic Risk
Board (ESRB)

38
One of the persistent shortcomings within EU financial regulation is that it is an economic and
monetary union (through the ECB and, for Eurozone members, based on the Euro) without being
a fiscal union – i.e., there is no EU- or Eurozone-level finance ministry equivalent. Among other
problems, the disconnect between single currency and potentially lax domestic fiscal policy can
lead to sovereign debt crises, like the ones in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (and thus the
Eurozone generally). Since 2012, the EU has made strides toward greater EU coordination, and
surveillance of Eurozone member state budgetary processes, in an effort to address this
considerable gap.
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Canada

US

UK

EU

Addressing
Systemic Risk
Across
Sectors

(SAC) 39
coordinates
among
regulators but
has no capital
markets
representative

recommendations
, designates bank
and non-bank
entities as
systemically
important,
coordinates
among relevant
regulators and
institutions

(FPC) plays
additional role in
generating
directions and
recommendations
, ensuring PRA
and FCA are
coordinating

generates
systemic risk
warnings and
makes
recommendation
s

Regulator
with
Responsibilit
y for Systemic
Risk in Capital
Markets

None

Primarily
Securities and
Exchange
Commission
(SEC) and
Commodity
Futures Trading
Commission
(CFTC)

BoE responsible
for overall
systemic stability

European
Supervisory
Authorities
(ESAs) 40 and
national
regulators

Some may also
cover banking,
insurance

CMSA
Authority
[proposed]

Prudential
Regulatory
Authority (PRA)
and Financial
Conduct Authority
(FCA) are
responsible
regulators

ECB and national
central banks
(monitoring) 41

39

Another committee, the Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee (FISC), has the same
membership as SAC but focuses more directly on ensuring federal coordination and
communication with regard to financial institution supervision. SAC is a discussion forum for
financial sector policy issues, including financial stability and systemic vulnerabilities. See IMF,
Canada Country Report at pp. 15-16, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1470.pdf
40
The ESAs are the three Union-level bodies with jurisdiction over banking, securities/derivatives
and insurance respectively: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
(EIOPA).
41

Under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), as of November 2014, banks deemed
“significant” are supervised directly by the ECB. The SSM is mandatory for all Eurozone member
state banks and voluntary for other non-Eurozone EU banks.
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Securities
Regulator(s)
Oversees
markets
for
securities and
derivatives

Canada

US

Provincial
securities
regulators
(day-to-day
regulation of
securities)

Primarily SEC and
CFTC

Coordination
through
Canadian
Securities
Administrators
(CSA)
(informal body,
re day-to-day
regulation of
securities)
Banking
Regulator
Oversees
banks

Office of the
Superintenden
t of Financial
Institutions
(OSFI)

UK

European
Securities and
Markets Authority
(ESMA) and
member state
securities
authorities

State-level
regulators for
intrastate and
some exempt
market
distributions

Primarily Federal
Reserve System
FDIC supervises
state-chartered
banks not part of
the Reserve
system

EU

PRA and FCA
jointly for all of
banking,
securities and
insurance

European
Banking Authority
(EBA) for
rulebook
ECB (for single
supervisory
mechanism),
assisted by
banking union
member state
central banks,
within Eurozone
Member state
banking
authorities
beyond Eurozone
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Insurance
Regulator(s)
Oversees
insurers

Canada

US

OSFI
(generally
prudential
regulation of
federally
regulated
insurers)

State-level
regulators

Provincial
insurance
regulators
(generally
market
conduct
regulation –
licensing and
marketing)

UK

Coordination
through National
Association of
Insurance
Supervisors
(informal body)

EU
European
Insurance &
Occupational
Pensions
Authority
(EIOPA) and
member state
insurance
authorities

Subject to federal
monitoring by
Federal Insurance
Office (FIO) under
Dodd-Frank Act
Title V

Coordination
through
Canadian
Council of
Insurance
Regulators
(informal
body) 42

II.

Comparing the Proposed CMSA with International Standards and
Transnational Regulatory Structures

23.

The proposed CMSA addresses systemic risk in capital markets in a
manner that is consistent with international policy guidance and with post-

42

CCIR members are the provincial/territorial insurance regulators. OSFI is an “associate
member”: http://www.ccir-ccrra.org/en/about/members.asp.
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crisis legislative developments in the other jurisdictions examined above,
once necessary differences due to each jurisdiction’s unique institutional
and constitutional arrangements are taken into account.
New Regulatory Structure
24.

The proposed CMSA would create within the same regulator a data
collection capacity, and a regulator on systemic risk in the Canadian capital
markets. Relative to the changes made in the other jurisdictions discussed
in this report, the changes proposed in the CMSA are relatively minimal,
and generally of a gap-filling variety. The CMSA would fill a gap around
systemic risk in the capital markets, providing oversight and the regulatory
capacity to address systemic risk in those markets only.

25.

The proposed CMSA would not create a broad systemic risk oversight body
over the entire financial market, as these other jurisdictions have done (US
FSOC, UK FPC, and EU ESRB). Nor would it establish a multi-agency
forum for discussing, responding to and coordinating action with respect to
systemic risk across financial sectors. Canada’s Senior Advisory
Committee (SAC) already serves that function, albeit presently with no
representation from a capital markets regulator, which drastically limits its
range. 43 The proposed CMSA would provide for oversight and regulation in
the capital markets only, contingent on a finding of systemic risk or systemic

43
It is expected that the new Authority (CMRA) with the statutory mandate to address systemic
risk in the Canadian capital markets, would acquire a seat on SAC. See Government of Canada,
Budget 2015, Chapter 4.1, http://www.budget.gc.ca/2015/docs/plan/ch4-1-eng.html. (“The Senior
Advisory Committee
supports the provision of advice on a broad range of issues related to the
stability of the Canadian financial system and legislative, regulatory, and policy issues affecting
the sector.
It is expected that the Capital Markets Regulatory Authority will contribute to SAC
deliberations after it has begun operating.”)
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importance, and with a requirement to consider what other regulation is
already in place.
26.

In terms of regulatory capacity concerning systemic risk, the Authority would
exercise powers similar to powers that national capital markets regulators
in the US, the UK, and the EU already have. Specifically, the proposed
CMSA would create a regulator with the capacity to manage systemic risk
in the capital markets in a way that, post-crisis, the US SEC, CFTC and
Federal Reserve can already substantially do; 44 that the UK FCA and PRA
can already substantially do; 45 and that member state authorities and

44

Dodd-Frank allows FSOC to determine that a nonbank financial company should be subject to
prudential supervision by the Federal Reserve, in order to address systemic risk. For their part,
the SEC and CFTC are responsible for discharging G20 Commitments relating to trade
repositories and central counterparty clearing of derivatives as discussed below, as well as
several other aspects not discussed in detail here: see Mary Jo White, Testimony on “Mitigating
Systemic Risk in the Financial Markets through Wall Street Reforms” (30 July 2013) at
https://www.sec.gov/News/Testimony/Detail/Testimony/1370539733678. The SEC has issued
several proposed rules in the last year seeking to impose additional requirements on the asset
management industry as well: US FSOC, “Update on Review of Asset Management Products and
Activities” (18 April 2016) at
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/news/Documents/FSOC%20Update%20on%20Review%
20of%20Asset%20Management%20Products%20and%20Activities.pdf at p. 2.
45

PRA regulates significant financial institutions (“PRA-authorised persons”) for prudential safety
and soundness. Its general objective is “promoting the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised
persons” but given that PRA-authorised persons are systemically significant, that objective is to
be advanced primarily by seeking to ensure that their business “is carried on in a way which
avoids any adverse effect on the stability of the UK financial system”, and seeking to minimize the
adverse effect that their failure could have on “the stability of the UK financial system”. Financial
Services Act of 2012 s. 2B(2), (3). The FCA also plays a role in regard to systemic risk through its
“integrity objective,” which is “protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system”
and which includes the UK financial system’s “soundness, stability and resilience”: Financial
Services Act of 2012 s. 1D(1), (2).
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European supervisory authorities can already substantially do.

46

Overarching bodies in these jurisdictions – FSOC, the FPC and the ESRB
respectively – can exercise regulatory powers to ensure that systemic risk
concerns are addressed, with the primary regulators listed above ultimately
applying the appropriate regulation to the market. 47
Definitions of Systemic Risk
27.

Under the CMSA, the central definition on which the Authority’s data
collection and regulatory powers rest is systemic risk to capital markets,
defined in s. 3:
“In this Act, systemic risk related to capital markets means a threat to the
stability of Canada’s financial system that originates in, is transmitted
through or impairs capital markets and that has the potential to have a
material adverse effect on the Canadian economy.”

28.

This definition is in line with definitions of systemic risk developed by
international bodies, and the other jurisdictions studied here. 48

46

See, e.g., the ESRB recommendations on member state macroprudential regulation, supra
note 35.
47
FSOC’s, the FPC’s and the ESRB’s powers are regulatory in the sense that those bodies have
meaningful powers vis-a-vis the primary regulators, although they do not directly regulate
financial market participants.
48

IMF et al., Guidance, supra note 3; IOSCO, “Risk Identification and Assessment Methodologies
for Securities Regulators”, at pp. 7-8 (“Systemic risk refers to the potential that an event, action,
or series of events or actions will have a widespread adverse effect on the financial system and,
in consequence, on the economy.
Systemic risk, in the context of securities markets is not
limited to sudden catastrophic events; it may also take the form of a more gradual erosion of
market trust.”); Dodd-Frank, supra note 27 at § 113(a)(1) (determining that a nonbank financial
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Data Collection in Relation to Systemic Risk
29.

As a joint FSB/IMF report to the G20 observed in 2009, “the recent crisis
has reaffirmed an old lesson—good data and good analysis are the lifeblood
of effective surveillance and policy responses at both the national and
international levels”. 49

30.

In its 2014 report on the stability of Canada’s financial sector, the IMF’s first
key recommendation, which it recommended be implemented in the short
term (i.e., within one to three years), was that Canada “[e]xpand financial
sector data collection and dissemination with a view to enhancing coverage,

company should be subject to prudential supervision where “material financial distress at the U.S.
nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness,
or mix of the activities of the U.S. nonbank financial company, could pose a threat to the financial
stability of the United States”); US FSOC, Annual Report (July 2011), p. 3 (““Although there is no
one way to define systemic risk, all definitions attempt to capture risks to the stability of the
financial system as a whole, as oppose to the risk facing individual financial institutions or market
participants,” and “[a] stable financial system should not be the source of, nor amplify the impact
of, shocks”); Financial Services Act 2012 (c. 21) Art. 9C(5), (6) (““systemic risk” means a risk to
the stability of the UK financial system as a whole or of a significant part of that system”
“whehter the risk arises in the United Kingdom or elsewhere”); Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macroprudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board
(“Systemic risk means a risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious
negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy. All types of financial
intermediaries, markets and infrastructure may be potentially systematically important to some
degree. Financial system means all financial institutions, markets, products and market
infrastructures”).
49

FSB/IMF, “The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps”, Report to the G-20 Finance Ministers
and Central Bank Governors (29 October 2009) at 4: http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/r 091029.pdf
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regularity, and availability of time-series to facilitate analysis.” 50 Pointing to
IOSCO Principles 6 and 7, which deal with systemic risk, the report noted:
“No single body has the mandate for macroprudential oversight nor do any
of the oversight committees [identifying FISC, SAC, the Heads of Agencies
Committee and the CSA Systemic Risk Committee] have the membership
that would allow for a comprehensive view of systemic risk across all
financial institutions and markets in Canada. In particular, risks in securities
markets, including linkages with other parts of the financial system, are not
systematically captured at a national level. Moreover, a unified approach to
analyzing risks that stem both from federally and provincially regulated
institutions and markets is lacking. No-one has a mandate to collect and
analyze data for the financial system—federally and provincially regulated
entities, unregulated entities, and markets—as a whole. Consequently, a
complete set of information is not collected on a systematic and regular
basis, and there are gaps in understanding certain segments of the markets
(e.g. holding company credit intermediation, some pension fund activities,
securities markets) and the interconnectedness among different areas of
the financial universe.” 51
31.

In the language of these recommendations, the proposed CMSA would not
create a “single body [with the] mandate for macroprudential oversight”.

50

IMF, IMF Country Report No. 14/29, “Canada: Financial Sector Stability Assessment”
(February 2014) at Table 1, “2013 FSAP Update – Key Recommendations” Table 1 at p. 7:
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1429.pdf
51

Ibid. (IMF country report) at para 56: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1429.pdf
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However, it would create a systemic risk regulator in the capital markets
whose subsequent membership on SAC would “allow for a comprehensive
view of systemic risk across all financial institutions and markets in
Canada.” The proposed CMSA would give the proposed Authority the
mandate to collect and analyze data in the capital markets, 52 filling an
identified “gap in understanding” and making it possible for Canada to
develop a “complete set of information

collected on a systematic and

regular basis” on its financial system.
32.

These data collection powers with respect to systemic risk in the capital
markets under the CMSA are comparable to those exercised by the OFR in
the US, 53 the FPC in the UK, 54 and ESRB in the EU. 55 The main difference
is that the data collection powers of those bodies reach beyond systemic
risk in capital markets, to extend to data collection across the capital
markets, banking, and insurance sectors.

52

Part 1 of the CMSA, “Information Collection and Disclosure”, gives the Authority duties and
powers with respect to information collection and disclosure. Those powers are circumscribed by
reference to the Act’s purpose, and with a view to whether the information or records are already
available elsewhere.
53

Dodd-Frank Title I Subtitle B establishes the Office of Financial Research, with a mandate to
support FSOC and other agencies by, inter alia, collecting data, standardizing how data is
reported and collected, performing research, and sharing data and writing reports. Dodd-Frank
Act, s. 153 (HR 4173) OFR may subpoena data from financial companies where that data is
required to carry out OFR’s functions. Ibid., s. 153(f). FSOC may collect information itself too per
s. 112(a)(2)(A).
54

The FPC is responsible for “monitoring the stability of the UK financial system with a view to
identifying and assessing systemic risks” and for preparing semi-annual financial stability reports:
Financial Services Act, s. 9G(1)(a), (d); see also ss. 9C(2), 9W.
55

EU Regulation No 1095/2010 at paras. 10, 11, 15.
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Designation as Systemically Important or Risky: Factors
33.

The proposed Authority (CMRA) is comparable to the US FSOC to the
degree that both can designate things as systemically important once they
pass a certain (qualitative or quantitative) systemic importance threshold.
Under the CMSA, that designation may be made for products, practices and
benchmarks. This approach focuses on the systemic risk arising within
markets, rather than on identifying systemically important entities as FSOC
primarily does. The focus on products, practices and benchmarks reflects
the current understanding of systemic risk, which is not necessarily housed
in particular entities so much as it is housed in the markets and networks
they share. 56

34.

Whenever the Authority is considering designating a benchmark, product or
practice as systemically important or risky, one of the factors it must take
into account is whether and how the benchmark, product, or practice is
already regulated. 57

56

This understanding is also developing in jurisdictions, like the US, that until recently have
focused primarily on entity-level designations. A focus on products and activities, rather than
entities, as the proper focus of systemic risk regulation has gained traction with respect to the
asset management (i.e., investment fund) industry. For a review of recent developments in the
US see, e.g., FSOC, “Update”, supra note 44; Morrison & Foerster LLP, “Possible Worlds Versus
Probable Worlds – the Metaphysics of Systemic Risk: FSOC Revisits Asset Managers” (26 April
2016) at https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=53907905-987f-4523-bc1fc260ac826730; Barney Jopson, Stephen Foley & Caroline Binham, “Fund managers to escape
‘systemic’ label” Financial Times (14 July 2015) at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4e9d566e-299911e5-8613-e7aedbb7bdb7.html#axzz47XlGxtkW (citing an “important change in the trajectory of
post-crisis regulation” toward focusing on markets rather than institutions).
57

CMSA, ss. 18(2)(g), 20(2)(h), 22(2)(f).
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35.

The other factors in the proposed CMSA for designating products, practices
or benchmarks as systemically risky or systemically important are
compatible with national and international understandings of how systemic
risk arises and how to regulate it.

36.

For example, in designating a benchmark as systemically important, the
CMSA requires the Authority to consider a series of factors that can be
summarized as looking at the benchmark’s systemic significance to the
capital markets, how broadly the benchmark is relied upon, and the process
by which the benchmark is determined. As the FSB notes, benchmarks are
essential components of financial infrastructure, and their integrity is
essential to market functioning. 58 (It should also be pointed out that
provincial securities regulators do not regulate benchmarks at all, and OSFI

58

In particular, they are important because benchmarks, and particularly the London Inter-Bank
Offered Rate (LIBOR), EURIBOR and TIBOR are the reference points for pricing an enormous
volume and range of other financial contracts, as well as commercial contracts and valuation
calculations. Moreover, there are no immediately obvious alternatives to existing benchmarks.
FSB, Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks (22 July 2014), http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/r 140722.pdf at 3; FSB, Final Report of the Market Participants Group on
Reforming Interest Rate Benchmarks (22 July 2014): http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/r 140722b.pdf. As part of the post-scandal reforms to LIBOR in the UK, and in
view of the limited data available to underpin its benchmark, Canadian dollar-denominated LIBOR
rates were terminated: Anthony Browne, “Libor now has a new administrator – but our reforms
have gone much further” (11 July 2013) http://www.cityam.com/article/libor-now-has-newadministrator-our-reforms-have-gone-much-further. However, Canada continues to use (and as
result of the C$ removal from LIBOR may rely more heavily on) its two domestic benchmarks, the
Canadian Dollar Offered Rate (CDOR) and the Canadian Overnight Repo Rate (CORRA). As of
October 2015, CDOR was the benchmark for setting interest payments on approximately USD$9
trillion of interest rate swaps, and close to C$1 trillion in certain other kinds of derivatives:
http://financial.thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/openweb/documents/pdf/financial/canadianbenchmarks-iosco-principles.pdf at 9. A wide range of other instruments, including residential
mortgage rates, is also keyed to this benchmark.
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only partially regulates them, 59 so this is a particularly obvious gap in the
Canadian regulatory scheme.)
37.

In designating a class of securities or derivatives to be systemically
important, as well, the Authority must consider, effectively, the systemic
significance of the products themselves (or the markets for those products),
including their complexity, interconnectedness, level of standardization,
volume and value of the market for them, and extent to which trading in
them could transmit risks through the system. In designating a practice to
be systemically risky, the Authority must consider, effectively, the systemic
effect of engaging in a practice (e.g., whether it has the effect of
concentrating risk in non-transparent spaces, whether it relies on
characteristics that are known to be risky, such as maturity transformation,
and the extent to which it could transmit risks through the system.

38.

The CMSA criteria – complexity, interconnectedness, size, concentration,
maturity transformation – closely reflect the indicia of systemic risk the FSB,

59

Benchmark-setting involves two sets of parties: the submitters, which are the banks that
provide underlying information; and the administrator, which translates that information into an
actual benchmark. OSFI acquired oversight of banks’ activities in relation to benchmarks through
amendments to the Bank Act in July 2014: http://lawslois.justice.gc.ca/eng/annualstatutes/2014 20/page-34.html. However, CDOR’s and CORRA’s
administrator, Thomson Reuters, is not a bank and is not subject to OSFI’s oversight. As the
Canadian Bankers Association has noted, “[a]s outlined in the IOSCO Principles, the
Administrator has primary responsibility for all aspects of the Benchmark determination process
such as benchmark methodology, compilation and publication of the rate, and establishing
credible and transparent governance, oversight and accountability procedures.”:
http://www.cba.ca/en/research-and-advocacy/93-cdor-corra-administrator-tender-notice/722-cdor-corra-administrator-tender-notice. The absence of regulatory oversight of the Administrator of
both Canada’s benchmarks is noteworthy.
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IMF, and BIS have jointly identified. 60 It reflects the criteria in the DoddFrank Act for designation of a systemically important financial company in
the US, 61 with the UK’s more general description of systemic risk, 62 and with
the EU. 63

60

Report, supra note 3 at paras 12-21 and Box 1. The report’s three main assessment criteria for
systemic risk, relating to markets as well as institutions, are size, lack of substitutability, and
interconnectedness. Contributing factors include leverage, liquidity risks and large mismatches
(which tend to accompany maturity transformation), and complexity.
61

Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 27 at s. 113(a) allows FSOC to determine that a nonbank financial
company should be subject to prudential supervision if it determines that “material financial
distress at the U.S. nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the U.S. nonbank financial company, could pose a
threat to the financial stability of the United States”. In making that determination, FSOC must
consider a range of factors including its leverage and exposure, interconnectedness, size,
liabilities including reliance on short-term funding, and generally “the nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, and mix of the activities of the company”. Ibid. s. 113(a)((2).
When determining to impose more stringent regulation on a financial activity, Dodd-Frank
requires FSOC to consider the conduct, scope, nature, size, scale, concentration, or
interconnectedness of the activity or practice, in relation to its ability to create or increase the risk
of significant liquidity, credit or other problems spreading among financial companies and in the
financial markets. Ibid., s. 120(a).
62

Financial Services Act, supra note 31 at s. 9C(3) describes systemic risks to include, in
particular, “systemic risks attributable to structural features of financial markets, such as
connections between financial institutions”, “systemic risks attributable to the distribution of risk
within the financial sector,” and “unsustainable levels of leverage, debt or credit growth”.
63

Regulation (EU) No. 1092/2010 (24 November 2010) at para 9: “The key criteria helping to
identify the systemic importance of markets and institutions are size (the volume of financial
services provided by the individual component of the financial system), substitutability (the extent
to which other components of the system can provide the same services in the event of failure)
and interconnectedness (linkages with other components of the system). An assessment based
on those three criteria should be supplemented by a reference to financial vulnerabilities and the
capacity of the institutional framework to deal with financial failures and should consider a wide
range of additional factors such as, inter alia, the complexity of specific structures and business
models, the degree of financial autonomy, intensity and scope of supervision, transparency of
financial arrangements and linkages that may affect the overall risk of institutions”.
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Regulatory Powers to Address Systemic Risk
39.

Designated systemically important benchmarks could be subject to
additional requirements, prohibitions and restrictions put in place in order to
address a systemic risk to capital markets. In particular, the CMSA would
permit the Authority to prescribe requirements in relation to the
administrator’s responsibilities in order to address a systemic risk related to
capital markets. Where a product has been designated as systemically
important, it would also permit the Authority to regulate in relation to the
method or process used to price or value the securities or derivatives, or to
rates, indices or other underlying a class of derivatives, again in order to
address a systemic risk related to capital markets. This is in line with
IOSCO’s July 2013 Principles for Financial Benchmarks, which both the
FSB and G20 have endorsed, and with efforts in the UK and EU. 64

64

IOSCO Final Report, supra note 24 at pp. 9-29. IOSCO’s principles, which are designed to
provide a “framework of standards” and a “set of recommended practices”, address: ensuring that
administrators have governance arrangements in place that are suitably designed to protect the
integrity of the benchmark determination process and to address conflicts of interest; ensuring the
quality and integrity of benchmark determinations and determination methodology in terms their
analytical design, data adequacy, transparency, and planning for transitions or material changes;
and accountability (e.g., audit requirements, complaints procedures and obligations to cooperate
with regulatory authorities. IOSCO has conducted annual reviews of the standards’
implementation by EURIBOR (in the EU), LIBOR (in the UK) and TIBOR (in Japan) administrators
in February 2015 and February 2016, generally finding that the administrators are proactively
working toward implementing the standards but that progress has been greater in implementing
principles related to benchmark quality, as opposed to principles related to governance,
transparency and accountability. (Benchmark regulation in the UK was wholly changed in
response to the LIBOR scandal). The EU is in the process of adopting a benchmark regulation
consistent with IOSCO’s principles, to which ESMA contributed technical advice and draft
technical standards. The US does not directly regulate benchmarks, although it can and has
brought enforcement actions in relation to benchmark manipulation. It relies on the UK in
particular, as regulator of LIBOR, for actual regulation.
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40.

After considering the factors that can make a product systemically important
or a practice systemically risky, the CMSA would empower the Authority to
prescribe a class of products or a practice as systemically important or
systemically risky. Once so prescribed, those products or practices could
be subject to additional requirements, prohibitions and restrictions put in
place in order to address a systemic risk to capital markets. The CMSA
allows for regulations relating to designated systemically important products
to be promulgated essentially around four main categories of things: first,
their trading, clearing and settlement; second, the transparency of their
trades to the extent disclosure is not already required; third, the means by
which they are priced; and finally, requirements going to prudential and risk
management, including capital and leverage requirements, margin and
collateral limits, the retention of risk, and policies and procedures for risk
management. In relation to systemically risky practices, regulation may be
promulgated essentially around four categories too: risk management
including related aspects of governance; transparency and disclosure to the
extent they are not already required; capital and leverage requirements,
margin and collateral limits and the like; and credit ratings.

41.

Considering these provisions in the context of actual issues, these
provisions would permit Canada, in keeping with the G20 Commitments, to
impose CCP clearing and trade reporting obligations on OTC derivatives
trades. The G20 Commitments provide for two main responses to the
systemic risks posed by OTC derivatives. The first is that standardized OTC
derivatives contracts be cleared through central counterparties, and the
second is that non-standardized OTC derivatives trades be recorded
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through a trade repository. 65 The US 66 and the EU 67 are in the process of
implementing these G20 Commitments, and the CMSA provisions above
could provide for them too. The CMSA provisions are flexible enough to
reflect evolving knowledge and practices as well. For example, the BIS and
IOSCO have proposed, and some US regulators have already adopted,
additional margining practices for all non-cleared OTC derivative
transactions. 68 An initiative of that nature could also be accomplished under
the CMSA.
42.

The same could be said with regard to securities repurchase (or “repo”)
transactions and other securities lending transactions. 69 For the reasons

65

See supra notes 13, 15.

66
Dodd-Frank, supra note 27, Title VII sets out a clearing requirement for swaps (the US word for
derivatives) that the SEC and CFTC determine should be cleared.
67

Under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation, Regulation No 648/2012 on OTC
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR), ESMA proposes which products
should be subject to mandatory clearing. EMIR applies directly in the UK as well.
68

BIS/IOSCO, “Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives” (March 2015),
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d317.pdf. The report suggests at page 4 that margin requirements
are more targeted and dynamic than existing credit requirements, and their increased use would
“have a useful influence on incentives”. In the US, see Federal Reserve et al., Join Press
Release, “agencies Finalize Swap Margin Rule” (30 October 2015), at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20151030b.htm; CFTC, Release
PR7294-15, “CFTC Approves Final Rule on Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap
Dealers and Major Swap Participants” (16 December 2015) at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7294-15.
69

A more detailed discussion of repo transactions, OTC derivatives, money market funds and
other financial innovations is in the report of Andrew Metrick.
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discussed by Darrell Duffie, 70 these repo transactions can be risky. There
is evidence that in response to regulation in the US banking sector, that
country’s repo market is moving away from banks and into the nonbank
(i.e., the capital markets) space. 71 The IMF and the FSB have called for
imposing

additional

margin

and

“haircut”

requirements

on

such

transactions, to reduce the systemic risk associated with those markets. 72
Repo transaction margin requirements are or could be also provided for in
the US, 73 and the EU. 74 The CMSA would provide for this in Canada as
well.
43.

Additionally, the issue of risk retention in asset securitization transactions
(what is sometimes referred to as the requirement that someone selling
securitized assets also retain some “skin in the game”) has received
considerable attention. The FSB has discussed. Dodd-Frank imposes a

70

Report of Darrell Duffie, section “Securities financing transactions: repos and sec lending” at p.
44 and following.
71

Katy Burne, “Repo Market Sees a Lending Shift as Rules Bite” The Wall Street Journal (7 April
2015) at http://www.wsj.com/articles/repo-market-sees-a-lending-shift-as-rules-bite-1428450643.
72

IMF, “Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy” (10 June 2013) para. 64, at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013b.pdf; FSB, “Strengthening Oversight and
Regulation of Shadow Banking: Policy Framework for Addressing Shadow Banking Risks in
Securities Lending and Repos,” (29 August 2013) at http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/r_130829b.pdf?page_moved=1; FSB, “Transforming Shadow Banking into
Resilient Market-based Finance” (12 November 2015) at http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/SFT haircuts framework.pdf.
73

Dodd-Frank s. 165(e)(2) would allow the Federal Reserve by regulation to limit credit exposure
to repos and securities borrowing for systemically important nonbank financial companies.
74

See EMIR, supra note 67; EU Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Directive
2014/65/EU (“MiFID 2” and the companion MiFIR) . Both also apply in the UK.
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skin-in-the-game requirement. 75 The EU and UK also impose risk retention
obligations. 76 The CMSA risk retention provisions above would permit this
as well.
44.

As Professor Duffie’s report describes, money market funds (MMFs) are
investment funds that hold short term, liquid assets. Although they are
created and sold within the capital markets, from the investor’s perspective
they serve effectively the same function that a depository account at a bank
would do. However, they can be subject to runs in times of crisis. 77 The
US, 78 and the EU 79 have begun to address the risks that may be associated
with MMFs, and the CMSA provisions above would permit this as well.

45.

To be clear, all of these are requirements that are geared toward identifying
and addressing the buildup of systemic risk, not normal risks to investors,

75

Dodd Frank requires asset securitizers to retain an economic interest of at least 5% of the
credit risk of any asset that the securitizer sells through an asset-backed security, and the
securitizer is prohibited from directly or indirectly hedging or transferring that retained credit risk.
Dodd-Frank, 12 USC 5301 (2010), ss, 941-943, 945.
76

The EU imposes risk retention requirements in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, which applies to
the UK, as a member state. The EU is currently reforming its securitization framework, including
risk-retention rules, to enhance the effectiveness of regulation in this area. online:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release STATEMENT-15-6239 en.htm?locale=en
77

Report of Darrell Duffie, section “Money Market Mutual Funds” at p. 50 and following.

78

US SEC Final Rule, Release No. 33-9616 Money Market Fund Reform (23 July 2014), online:
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/33-9616.pdf.
79
European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Money Market Funds /* Com/2013/0615 final (2013), online:
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/investment/money-market-funds/index en.htm. EU MMF regulation
would apply in the UK: see European Parliament, “Money Market Funds: Impact Assessment of
Substantive EP Amendments” (March 2015) at p. 18, online:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/547545/EPRS STU(2015)547545 E
N.pdf.
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within the capital markets in particular. Each set of responses is different in
kind to the disclosure-based and registrant business conduct requirements
that tend to be associated with day-to-day capital markets regulation.
46.

The above specific products and practices are perhaps the main concerns
of systemic risk regulators today, and the CMSA gives the Authority the
ability to respond to those risks in a way that is compatible with its peer
countries and with international understandings of systemic risk. At the
same time, future concerns that may arise as a result of financial innovation,
and that we cannot yet predict, can also be addressed under the CMSA’s
focus on benchmarks, products and practices – contingent always on a
finding of systemic risk or systemic importance, and with a requirement to
consider what other regulation is already in place.
Urgent Order Powers in Relation to Systemic Risk

47.

Finally, the CMSA gives the Authority the ability to enact urgent orders
where, in its view, they are necessary to address a “serious and immediate”
systemic risk concerning the capital markets. The federal Minister of
Finance may order the Authority to make an urgent order as well, after
consultation, under s. 25. An urgent order may suspend or restrict a
product’s trading, or prevent or restrict a person from trading, from reducing
their capital or financial resources or from engaging in a practice. The order
is effective for 15 days but may be extended once.

48.

All other comparator jurisdictions have this power. In the US, the SEC has
possessed urgent order power since 1934, and the Federal Reserve now
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has additional powers in the event that a systemically important company
poses a “grave threat” to US financial stability. 80
III.

CMSA powers as compared to provincial / territorial securities
regulatory provisions

49.

The CMSA provisions are different in kind from provincial / territorial
securities regulatory provisions.

50.

Whenever the Authority is considering designating a benchmark, product or
practice as systemically important or risky, one of the factors it must take
into account is whether and how the benchmark, product, or practice is
already regulated. Once a product, practice or benchmark has been
designated as systemically risky or systemically important, the CMSA
allows the federal government to impose additional requirements on
designated products, practices or benchmarks as necessary to address the
problem of systemic risk in particular, but it does not supplant underlying
and ongoing regulation of those products, practices or benchmarks.

51.

As discussed above, the powers provided for in the proposed are different
in nature from the powers provided for in provincial and territorial securities
regulation. The powers provided for in the proposed CMSA go to addressing

80

Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 says that in emergency circumstances,
the SEC may summarily take action to alter, supplement, suspend, or impose requirements or
restrictions with respect to any matter or action subject to SEC regulation or under securities law,
if the SEC determines that it is necessary “in the public interest and for the protection of
investors”. Such emergency orders must not exceed 30 days. Dodd-Frank s. 121(a) states that in
the event of such a grave threat, the Federal Reserve, with 2/3 approval of FSOC, must take
actions necessary to mitigate such risk, including restricting the company’s mergers or
acquisitions, product offerings, activities and the manner in which activities are conducted, or
even ordering a sale or transfer of assets to unaffiliated companies.
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risks to the system as a whole, particularly through prudential regulatory
tools. The powers provided for in provincial and territorial securities
regulation go to investor protection, and to market participant regulation with
regard to conflicts of interest, information asymmetries, anti-fraud measures
and the like.
52.

Notably, the provinces and territories remain responsible for the day-to-day
regulation of:
i.

Products (securities and derivatives) in the capital markets, for the
purpose of investor protection;

ii.

Practices in the capital markets, for the purpose of investor protection;

iii.

Self-regulatory organizations, i.e., IIROC and MFDA, which operate
pursuant to delegated authority from relevant provincial or territories
securities regulators;

iv.

Trading facilities, including exchanges and alternative trading systems.
Like self-regulatory organizations, exchanges operate under delegated
provincial / territorial authority. Provincial jurisdiction remains intact
except to the extent under the CMSA, designated systemically important
products can be regulated “including in relation to their trading on a
trading facility”, and the Authority can invoke its urgent order powers to
suspend or restrict trading on a trading facility where necessary to
address a “serious and immediate systemic risk related to capital
markets”.
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v.

Clearing houses [jointly with Bank of Canada], but for the obligation to
centrally clear systemically important products; 81

vi.

Trade repositories [subject to OSFI guidance], but for the obligation to
report systemically important products to them, and where, on the trade
repository’s own application, it is a “designated trade repository” for
information collection and disclosure purposes under the CMSA Part 1;

vii.

Registrants (e.g., dealers, advisers and investment fund managers):
Since 2009, dealers, advisers and investment fund managers have been
regulated by provincial and territorial regulators under NI 31-103 and
under the “81 series” of national instruments. The proposed CMSA does
not displace that and does not seek to regulate dealers as entities. To
the extent that dealers’ and advisers’ have exposures and liabilities
involving particular systemically important products or systemically risky
practices, however, any additional obligations under the CMSA that
relate to those products or practices will apply to them in dealers’ and
advisers’ hands as well;

viii.

Credit rating agencies, but for their use and conflicts of interest involved
in their determination with respect to systemically risky practices: credit
rating agencies must be registered with provincial and territorial

81

In fact, what the CMSA would put in place for systemically important products or systemically
risky practices looks very much like what is already in place for the main clearing houses in the
securities and derivatives spaces, CDS Clearing and Depository Services Inc. (CDS) and
Canadian Derivatives Clearing Corporation (CDCC) respectively. The Ontario, Québec and
British Columbia provincial securities regulators are responsible for these clearing houses’ day-today oversight, but the BoC oversees their systemic importance aspects. Both (along with
SwapClear, a global clearing system whose lead regulator is the BoE) have been designated as
systemically important pieces of financial market infrastructure under s. 4(1) of the federal
Payment Clearing and Settlement Act, S.C. 1996, c. 6.
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securities regulators as a “designated rating organization” (DRO) in
order for their ratings to satisfy securities law requirements. DROs must
abide by a code of conduct, which includes rules in relation to
governance, conduct, conflicts of interest, required filings and
disclosure;
ix.
53.

Any other aspects of the day-to-day regulation of the securities markets.
As the IMF noted in its 2014 Financial Stability Report, Canada’s regulation
of the day-to-day operations of the securities markets exhibit “a high level
of implementation” of IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation (2010). 82 The CMSA does not disturb that day-to-day regulation.
That said, as the IMF has noted, gaps remain. 83

82

IMF Country Report, supra note 50 at para 48.

83

Ibid.
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Appendix A: Financial Regulation in the US, the UK and the European Union
Explanatory note
1.

The diagram of financial regulation for each jurisdiction distinguishes between the
following three levels of regulation.
Consumer / Investor facing:

2.

The regulation of the subject as it relates to customers or investors. E.g., regulation
of the relationship between individual customers / clients / market participants and
securities or derivatives. Examples would be regulation of the distribution of
securities or derivatives in the primary or secondary markets; regulation of banks’
or insurance companies’ relationships to their clients; regulation that applies to
companies submitting information to benchmarks.
Business Conduct:

3.

Intermediary regulation, including prudential regulation of market participants. This
includes the regulation of professionals in the industry, or institutions operating in
the industry in terms of their structure, qualifications, standards, and safety and
soundness. Examples would be regulation of capital markets registrants (dealers
and advisers); regulation of banks or insurance companies themselves, apart from
their client relationships; regulation that applies to companies administering
benchmarks.
Systemic Risk

4.

Regulatory oversight and regulatory tools capable of detecting, monitoring, and
preventing systemic risk. This includes regulation which addresses systemic risk
within a particular financial market, such as insurance or securities and derivatives.
It also includes the regulatory structures which have oversight over all the financial
markets in a particular jurisdiction. Examples of measures taken at this level would
include data collection in relation to systemic risk; designation of particular
products or practices as systemically important or risky; directions and

recommendations to other regulators, urgent orders triggered by serious,
immediate or grave threats to financial stability; and the direct use of
macroprudential tools such as modified capital, liquidity or margin requirements,
haircuts, and selling bans.1

1

Some of these tools are discussed by other experts in this file, notably Mr. Duffie, “Microprudential versus
macroprudential regulation” at page 36 and following; and Mr. Metrick
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5.

US financial regulation is similar to Canada’s in that it maintains the traditional
banking / insurance / securities three-part regulatory distinction, and it is a federal
system. However, its federal system operates quite differently.

6.

US banking regulation is complex and has both state and federal aspects. Three
federal banking regulators oversee different institutions. As is the norm for banking
regulation, the main focus is prudential regulation.

7.

Securities regulation in the US is primarily federal. At the federal level are the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), which are the primary regulators for the vast majority of
capital markets issues and market participants. Federal legislation pre-empts state
securities regulation subject to limited exemptions.2 For systemic risk purposes,
federal jurisdiction occupies the field. US federal regulators, notably the SEC and
the CFTC, have skirmished in the past over the boundaries of their respective
jurisdictions. However, the SEC and the CFTC can regulate US capital markets
“all the way up” (and down, subject to the exemptions above), including with
respect to systemic risk. In 2010, in response to the financial crisis, the US enacted
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act), which gave the SEC and CFTC additional powers, particularly to regulate
derivatives.3

2

Exemptions exist for purely intrastate securities regulation; licensing for investment professionals and their
firms operating within a state; non-class action securities fraud lawsuits (of which there are very few); and
small, non-exchange traded, exempt market securities sold in the state. See Securities Act of 1933, s.
3(a)(11); SEC Regulation A, and Rule 504 of SEC Regulation D. Within the exemptions, where federal
legislation does not pre-empt, background state securities regulation applies. A Small Corporate Offering
Registration (SCOR) program exists between some state regulators, which operates somewhat like the
passport system in Canada, for SEC-exempt offerings, though (as with the passport program) not all states
participate and state-based regulatory standards are not fully harmonized.

3

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203. The new regulatory
powers are described at Title VII, Subtitle A (“Regulation of Over-the-Counter Swaps Markets”).

8.

As with Canadian securities regulation, US insurance regulation is state-based,
and caselaw has reinforced state jurisdiction over insurance regulation. However,
the Dodd-Frank Act created a new federal authority and new federal jurisdiction –
to recommend, consult, advise but not actually to regulate – with regard to
systemic risk in the insurance sector.4 (See below, also, regarding FSOC
designation of systemically important insurers.)

9.

Dodd-Frank also established a new body, the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC). FSOC has several functions, including:
•

Collecting information on financial firms from regulators and through the new
Office of Financial Research, and monitoring the financial system to identify
potential systemic risks;

•

Facilitating information sharing and coordination among financial regulators;

•

Making regulatory recommendations to financial regulators, including “new or
heightened standards or safeguards”, and identifying gaps in regulation that
could pose systemic risk; and,

•

Designating financial companies as “systemically important financial
institutions” (SIFIs), which has the effect of imposing more stringent regulatory
requirements on those institutions. The Federal Reserve acts as the primary
regulator for all financial institutions (both bank and non-bank, or “shadow

4

Dodd-Frank s. 502 establishes in the Treasury the Federal Insurance Office (FIO), which is authorized,
inter alia:
(A) to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry, including identifying issues or gaps in the regulation of
insurers that could contribute to a systemic crisis in the insurance industry or the United States financial
system; …
(C) to recommend to the Financial Stability Oversight Council that it designate an insurer, including the
affiliates of such insurer, as an entity subject to regulation as a nonbank financial company supervised by
the Board of Governors pursuant to title I of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act; … [and]
(E) to coordinate Federal efforts and develop Federal policy on prudential aspects of international insurance
matters …

banks” operating in the capital markets, and insurance companies) that FSOC
designates as SIFIs.5

5

SIFIs include banks with consolidated assets over $50 billion, which are automatically deemed
systemically important and require no further designation; and non-bank financial companies that FSOC
has designated as systemically important: see Dodd-Frank s. 113, FSOC Final Rule on Authority to Require
Supervision and Regulation of Certain Non-bank Financial Companies, 12 C.F.R. Para 1310. Dodd-Frank
identifies systemically important financial companies as being those that could pose a threat to financial
stability through either the company’s material financial distress or the company’s ongoing activities.
Section 165 of Dodd-Frank requires the Federal Reserve to establish enhanced supervision and prudential
standards for SIFIs, including in relation to how much capital they need to keep on hand, leverage and
liquidity limits, overall risk management, corrective action plans (including orderly resolution in the event of
bankruptcy), and any other prudential standard that the Federal Reserve deems appropriate, either on its
own or on recommendation from FSOC.
As of June 2015, FSOC had designated as systemically important 33 bank holding companies with
consolidated assets greater than $50 billion, and four non-bank financial companies: American International
Group, Inc., General Electric Capital Corporation, Inc., Prudential Financial, Inc., and MetLife, Inc.. On
March 30, 2016, to general surprise and consternation, the US District Court for the District of Columbia
(per Collyer J.) rescinded MetLife’s SIFI designation on the basis that FSOC had failed to consider the cost
of designation, as it was held to be required to do under a “hard look” review under US administrative law
principles, in making its designation determination. MetLife vs. FSOC: https://morningconsult.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/fsoc-ruling.pdf. The decision seems ripe for appeal (Dodd-Frank in fact only says
that FSOC “shall” consider “any other risk-related factors that the Council deems appropriate”, not that it
must conduct a cost-benefit analysis) but in any event only speaks to entity-based designation under the
US scheme.
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[1] “Business conduct” means
a) when used in relation to the PRA: primarily prudential regulation over its regulatees (which are the systemically significant deposit takers, insurers, and some investment firms);
b) when used in relation to the FCA: (i) prudential regulation over all regulated entities falling outside the PRA’s remit (including asset managers, hedge funds, exchanges, insurance brokers, and financial advisors, but not
financial market infrastructures), and (ii) generally the professional regulation of registrants for qualifications and sound business practices, mitigating conflicts of interest, ensuring they adequately serve their clients’
interests, and the like; and
c)
when used in relation to regulation of financial market infrastructures by the Bank of England: generally the professional regulation of central counterparties and securities settlement systems to ensure they maintain
sound business practices and prudential standards and mitigate risks.
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10.

In the wake of the last financial crisis, the UK overhauled its financial regulatory
structure. The UK now has a wholly different regulatory model from the American
one or the Canadian one. The UK abolished its existing regulator, the Financial
Services Authority, and through the Financial Services Act of 2012 established
three new bodies.6 The UK adopted a version of “twin peaks” regulatory structure
under which one regulator, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), is
responsible for prudential regulation of systemically important institutions across
all of banking, capital markets and insurance. A separate regulator, the Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA), is responsible for investor protection, business conduct,
market integrity and competition across all of banking, capital markets and
insurance (as well as for prudential regulation of smaller, non-systemically
important institutions). The PRA is a subsidiary of the BoE.7 The UK’s membership
in the EU (but not the Eurozone) means that the UK’s financial system is also
subject to EU (but not specifically Eurozone) law.

11.

Each of the FCA and PRA has the duty to coordinate the exercise of its functions
with the other, and must co-operate with the BoE with regard to financial stability.8
In certain circumstances, the PRA can exercise a veto: it may instruct the FCA to
refrain from exercising its regulatory authority, if the PRA deems that that action

6

Financial Services Act of 2012, CITE. Strictly speaking, the 2012 Act continued the former FSA as the
new Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), and then it allocated prudential regulatory responsibility (at both
the micro and macro levels) to the Bank of England. The Bank’s subsidiary, the Prudential Regulatory
Authority (PRA), then became responsible for the microprudential regulation of systemically important
financial institutions. The FSA was described as “unified” because it was responsible for all financial
services – i.e., banking, capital markets and insurance – and for both prudential and market conduct
regulation of all those firms. After the crisis, it was determined that the FSA’s mandate contained inherent
conflicts of interest between prudential and market conduct regulation, and moreover that the regulator had
placed emphasis on market conduct at the expense of prudential regulation. Northern Rock postmortem:
UK Financial Services Authority, Internal Audit Division. The Supervision of Northern Rock: A Lesson
Learned Review, (Mar. 2008), http://www.frank-cs.org/cms/pdfs/FSA/FSA_NR_Report_25.4.08.pdf.
7

Depository insurance covers the institutions that are prudentially regulated by the PRA, which means that
depository insurance in the UK extends beyond banks and to insurers and some investment firms. CITE.
8

Financial Services Act of 2012, Part 2 — Amendments of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 3D, 3Q.

could cause a financial institution to fail, and that its failure would have an adverse
effect on the UK financial system or threaten UK financial stability as a whole.9
12.

The BoE is responsible for overseeing UK financial stability as a whole. The new
new body established by the Financial Services Act of 2012 is the Financial Policy
Committee (FPC). The FPC is an independent subcommittee of the Court of
Directors of the BoE whose responsibility “in relation to the achievement by the
Bank of the Financial Stability Objective relates primarily to the identification of,
monitoring of, and taking of action to remove or reduce systemic risks with a view
to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system”.10 In this
respect, the FPC is somewhat analogous to FSOC in the US.11 The FPC does not
have direct regulatory responsibility for or authority over specific entities, but
instead implements its systemic risk measures through the PRA and FCA, as well
as through the Treasury and within the Bank. It has the authority to give directions
to the FCA and PRA requiring them to exercise their functions so as to ensure the
implementation of a macro-prudential measure described in the direction.12 The
FCA and PRA are then responsible for implementing the measures vis-à-vis the
regulated firms in question, and for subsequent compliance monitoring and
supervision. Directions must be complied with as soon as is reasonably
practicable.13 The FCP also has the power to make recommendations to the FCA,

9

Financial Services Act of 2012, Part 2 — Amendments of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 3I.

10

Financial Services Act 2012, U.K. 2012 c. 21, s. 9C. The Financial Stability Objective is to “protect and
enhance the stability of the financial system of the United Kingdom”: Bank of England Act 2009, UK 2009
c. 1 s. 2A.

11

The membership of the FPC is comprised of the Governor, three Deputy Governors, the Chief Executive
of the FCA, the BoE’s Executive Director for Financial Stability Strategy and Risk, four external members
as appointed by the Chancellor, and a non-voting member from the Treasury.

12

Financial Services Act of 2012, Part 1 – Bank of England, 9H(1)

13

Financial Services Act of 2012, Part 1 – Bank of England, 9I.

PRA, to the Treasury, within the Bank or to any persons.14 The FCA and PRA must
comply with the recommendation or explain its reason for not complying.15
13.

A main objective of the UK reforms was to close a gap in the pre-crisis system16 of
regulation, which lacked an authority responsible for identifying, monitoring and
responding to risks building up in the financial system. The FPC was meant to
address this key gap. The new scheme was also designed to bring together within
the BoE the responsibility for the micro-prudential regulation of individual entities
under the PRA, and the responsibility for macroprudential regulation under the
FPC.

14

Financial Services Act of 2012, Part 1 – Bank of England, 9O, 9P and 9Q.

15

Financial Services Act of 2012, Part 1 – Bank of England, 9Q(3).

16

Under the pre-crisis regime, the Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Treasury
were collectively responsible for financial stability.
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[1] “Business conduct” in the capital markets context refers generally to professional regulation of registrants for qualifications and sound business practices, mitigating conflicts of interest, adequately serve their clients’ interests, and
the like. Beyond capital markets (i.e. in banking and insurance), the term means primarily prudential requirements (See also footnote 23).
[2] This diagram depicts the roles of the micro-prudential regulators as a whole, not individually. The levels of “systemic risk”, “business conduct” and “investor/consumer facing” regulation refer to the overall system and may be
over-inclusive relative to any particular EU or member state regulator.

Figure

Investor / Consumer Facing

The European Union
14.

Under EU law, member states (like the UK) are generally responsible for
implementing law, so national authorities are the primary regulators. However,
following the last financial crisis, the EU reformed both the structure and content
of its financial regulation, establishing a new overarching European System of
Financial Supervision (ESFS), including new EU-level regulators and powers.17

15.

The ESFS facilitates coordination across financial sectors, and between the EU
and national levels. EU-level authorities now operate as oversight and regulatory
harmonization bodies that supervise the implementation and execution of EU
financial regulatory law by member states and their national authorities. They
monitor the EU markets, including the role of the national authorities, and facilitate
data collection and information exchange. The ESFS consists of the following
bodies:
•

The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). Its functions, all concerning
systemic risk, include data collection and sharing information; identifying and
prioritizing risks; issuing warnings and recommendations (to the Union, any
member state, or any relevant EU or member state regulator), which trigger an
“act or explain” mechanism; assessing emergency situations; and cooperating
with other ESFS parties, the ECB, and international bodies.18 In some ways the
ESRB is analogous to the US FSOC or the UK FPC, but with the ability to issue
warnings and recommendations to both EU and member state levels below.19

17

Less central to this report, the EU also made two other large changes: it established a Single Rulebook
for prudential regulation of all banks in the EU, including capital requirements and recovery and resolution
provisions; and it established a new banking union, in the form of the European Central Bank (ECB), aimed
at centralizing banking supervision and resolution for Eurozone countries. The ECB supervises all banks
within the banking union, and Eurozone members are required to participate in the Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Both are also open to the non-Eurozone EU
member states.
18

19

https://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/ESRB-en.pdf?5b068f19359d8a5d7a1008312ac116c4

Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on
European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic
Risk Board, [2010] OJ L 331/1, art 16. Notably, “[i]n order to increase their influence and legitimacy, such

•

Three sectoral European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), with powers to, inter
alia, implement technical standards associated with legislation within their
scope; issue guidelines and recommendations to national authorities or, in
certain cases, to specific financial institutions, which triggers a comply-orexplain mechanism;20 make decisions concerning specific national authorities
or, in certain cases, specific financial institutions (i.e. breach of EU law); and to
respond to emergency situations. ESAs also work with the ESRB in identifying
and measuring systemic risk. ESAs also have a seemingly broad systemic risk
power in the form of a “specialized and ongoing capacity to respond effectively
to the materialization of systemic risks, ... in particular, with respect to
institutions that pose a systemic risk”.21 They are the European Banking
Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and
the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).

•

Also part of the ESFS are a Joint Committee of the European Supervisory
Authorities (ESAs), which is a cross-sectoral body that focuses on enhancing
coordination across sectors, and the national competent authorities designated
by each Member State.

warnings and recommendations should also be transmitted [by the ESRB], subject to strict rules of
confidentiality, to the Council and the Commission and, where addressed to one or more national
supervisory authorities, to the ESAs”: ibid. at para 19.
20

See, e.g., Article 16.3 of Regulation establishing the European Banking Authority:
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=PE%2040%202010%20INIT. The other ESAs have the
same provision.
21

Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, [2010] OJ L 331/12, art 24.. EU law involves
binding instruments, such as regulations, directives and decisions, and non-binding instruments, such as
recommendations and opinions. Regulations apply directly throughout the EU, while directives must be
transposed into national law by member states. Directives bind all member states to achieve specified
goals, leaving form and method to the discretion of national governments. Decisions apply directly to those
they address.

Appendix B: Financial Regulation in Canada
Explanatory note
1.

The diagram of financial regulation for each jurisdiction, including the following one
for Canada, distinguishes between the following three levels of regulation.
Consumer / Investor facing:

2.

The regulation of the subject as it relates to customers or investors. E.g., regulation
of the relationship between individual customers / clients / market participants and
securities or derivatives. Examples would be regulation of the distribution of
securities or derivatives in the primary or secondary markets; regulation of banks’
or insurance companies’ relationships to their clients; regulation that applies to
companies submitting information to benchmarks.
Business Conduct:

3.

Intermediary regulation, including prudential regulation of market participants. This
includes the regulation of professionals in the industry, or institutions operating in
the industry in terms of their structure, qualifications, standards, and safety and
soundness. Examples would be regulation of capital markets registrants (dealers
and advisers); regulation of banks or insurance companies themselves, apart from
their client relationships; regulation that applies to companies administering
benchmarks.
Systemic Risk

4.

Regulatory oversight and regulatory tools capable of detecting, monitoring, and
preventing systemic risk. This includes regulation which addresses systemic risk
within a particular financial market, such as insurance or securities and derivatives.
It also includes the regulatory structures which have oversight over all the financial
markets in a particular jurisdiction. Examples of measures taken at this level would
include data collection in relation to systemic risk; designation of particular
products or practices as systemically important or risky; directions and

recommendations to other regulators, urgent orders triggered by serious,
immediate or grave threats to financial stability; and the direct use of
macroprudential tools such as modified capital, liquidity or margin requirements,
haircuts, and selling bans.22

22

Some of these tools are discussed by other experts in this file, notably Mr. Duffie, “Microprudential versus
macroprudential regulation” at page 36 and following; and Mr. Metrick
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[1] “Business conduct” in the capital markets context refers generally to professional regulation of registrants for qualifications and sound business practices, mitigating conflicts of interest, adequately serve their clients’ interests,
and the like. Beyond capital markets (i.e. in banking and insurance), the term means primarily prudential requirements (See also footnote 23).
[2] “Investor/consumer facing” regulation in banking falls to FCAC. This is excluded from the diagram, as it is not a core concern of this report.
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1.

Canada maintains a three-part, entity-based distinction between regulators:
•

Banks are federally regulated, by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions (OSFI), including with regard to systemic risk. Banking regulation in
Canada and elsewhere has historically focused on prudential regulation,
meaning ensuring banks’ safety and soundness, including by requiring them to
maintain capital on hand and not to leverage themselves excessively.
Consumer deposits were also protected by depository insurance (e.g., Canada
Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) in Canada), and systemically important
banks could be supported by the Bank of Canada’s “lender of last resort”
function. Prudential regulation, which imposed compliance costs on banks, was
the quid pro quo for the state guarantee of liquidity.23

•

The capital markets are regulated based on a different premise: regulation is
disclosure-based and, for registrants, directed toward mitigating conflicts of
interest and information asymmetries, so that investors can make informed
decisions about the risks they choose to run. The purpose of the securities
markets is to make it possible for private companies to raise capital and for the
public to invest money in those companies. Unlike the prudential regulation that
characterized the banking sector, securities regulation historically has been
market-oriented, disclosure-based and risk-loving (in the sense of the
relationship between risk and return). Investments are not guaranteed.

•

Insurance regulation is essentially consumer protection-oriented and directed
toward preventing unfair trade practices. In recent decades it has expanded to
cover some prudential regulation of insurers. In Canada, it is mainly the
provinces and territories that regulate insurance (for example agents’ and
brokers’ registration). OSFI does some prudential regulation.

23

Credit union regulation is not discussed in this report in any jurisdiction.

2.

The provinces and territories carry out the day-to-day regulation of the capital
markets. The CMSA proposes to regulate for systemic risk, including data
collection, in the capital markets.

3.

Canada also has a Senior Advisory Committee (SAC), a non-statutory consultative
body and forum for policy discussion on issues pertaining to the financial sector. It
is chaired by the Deputy Minister of Finance and its members are the BoC,
Department of Finance, CDIC, Financial Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC)
and OSFI. This means that SAC can coordinate among all the federal-level entities
listed in table 1 above in relation to the stability of the Canadian financial system.
The CMRA would presumably join this committee.24

24

See IMF, IMF Country Report No. 14/29, “Canada: Financial Sector Stability Assessment” (February
2014): https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1429.pdf; also Government of Canada, Budget
2015, Chapter 4.1, http://www.budget.gc.ca/2015/docs/plan/ch4-1-eng.html. (“The Senior Advisory
Committee … supports the provision of advice on a broad range of issues related to the stability of the
Canadian financial system and legislative, regulatory, and policy issues affecting the sector. … It is
expected that the Capital Markets Regulatory Authority will contribute to SAC deliberations after it has
begun operating.”)

